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1  Introduction
Nearly four years ago the Constitutional Court introduced a new concept 
into the law of evictions. After hearing oral argument in Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg1 (“Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road”) the Constitutional Court 
issued an interim order2 that directed the parties “to engage with each 
other meaningfully”.3 In this case the City of Johannesburg sought to evict 
approximately 400 people from six buildings in terms of the fire bylaws of 
the City, section 20 of the Health Act 63 of 1977 and section 12(4)(b) of the 
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. The 
occupiers opposed the application because an eviction and relocation to an 
informal settlement on the outskirts of the city would destroy their livelihood 
strategies that depended on being able to conduct informal trading, domestic 
work and recycling in the inner city of Johannesburg.
The Court explained that the purpose of this engagement order was to 
determine whether the values of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”), the constitutional and statutory obligations 
of the City, and the rights of the applicants could direct the parties to resolve 
the dispute of the application amicably.4 The engagement between the 
parties also had to determine whether the plight of the applicants would be 
alleviated if the dangerous and ailing buildings that they occupied could be 
* I would like to thank the Overarching Strategic Research and Outreach Project on Combating Poverty, 
Homelessness and Socio-Economic Vulnerability under the Constitution for financial support  I would 
like to thank Prof Sandra Liebenberg (HF Oppenheimer Chair in Human Rights Law) and Prof AJ van 
der Walt (South African Research Chair in Property Law) for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
text which forms part of my LLD dissertation entitled “The Impact of Section 26 of the Constitution 
on the Eviction of Squatters in South African Law”  I would also like to thank Prof Geo Quinot for 
actively engaging with me about meaningful engagement over the past four years and the anonymous peer 
reviewers for their helpful comments on the article
1 2008 3 SA 208 (CC)
2 The interim order was issued on 30-08-2007  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 
Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg (Interim Order 30 August 2007) (CCT 24/07) ZACC 
(30-08-2007) Constitutional Court of South Africa <www constitutionalcourt org za/Archimages/10731
PDF> (accessed 17-11-2011) (“Interim Order”)
3 Order 1  
4 Order 1
       
upgraded.5 Furthermore, the interim order directed the parties to report back 
to the Court on the results of the engagement between them.6 This engagement 
process resulted in the parties reaching an agreement7 on the interim measures 
that the City would take to improve the living conditions on the properties8 
and the status of the City’s eviction application against the occupiers.9 The 
Court subsequently endorsed this agreement.10
Five months later, the Court, in its judgment explained that a municipality 
would be acting in a manner that was generally at odds with the spirit and 
purpose of a range of constitutional obligations if it evicted people from 
their homes without first meaningfully engaging with them.11 The Court 
explicitly linked meaningful engagement with the obligation to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures within its available resources to provide access 
to adequate housing.12 The Court affirmed its interpretive approach to the 
right of access to adequate housing by also linking the obligation to engage with 
the right to human dignity13 and the right to life.14 Finally, the Court linked 
meaningful engagement with the obligations that municipalities have to strive 
towards the provision of services in a sustainable manner;15 the promotion 
of social and economic development;16 and the involvement of communities 
and community organisations in the affairs of local government.17
The Court makes it plain in these reasons for the engagement order that 
homelessness as a result of eviction is still a very real possibility for many 
people. Local authorities should therefore engage with these people before any 
decision is taken on the formulation and implementation of a housing policy 
or programme that will inevitably lead to their eviction and relocation.
The Court proceeded to define meaningful engagement as “a two-way 
process” in which a local authority and those that stand to be evicted would 
5 Order 2
6 Order 3
7 The parties reached the agreement on 29-10-2007  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 
Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg (Agreement 29 October 2007) (CCT 24/07) ZACC 
(29-10-2007) (“Agreement”)
8 Cl 1 1 1
9 Cl 1 1 2  
10 The order was issued on 05-11-2007  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg (Order 5 November 2007) (CCT 24/07) ZACC (05-11-2007) <www
constitutionalcourt org za/Archimages/11584 PDF> (accessed 17-11-2011)  
11 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 16  See s 19 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998; 
ss 16(1) and 17 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000  See further the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 4: The Right to Adequate 
Housing (1991) UN Doc E/1992/23 paras 8, 12; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
General Comment No 7: The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions (1997) UN Doc E/1998/22 
paras 13, 15
12 S 26(2) of the Constitution; s 9(1)(a)(i) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997
13 S 10 of the Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected”  See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 
(CC) para 83; S Liebenberg “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” (2005) 
21 SAJHR 1 1-31  
14 S 11 of the Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life”
15 S 152(1)(b) of the Constitution
16 S 152(1)(c)  
17 S 152(1)(e)  
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talk to each other meaningfully in order to achieve certain objectives.18 
The Court held further that meaningful engagement had the potential to 
contribute towards the resolution of disputes and “to increased understanding 
and sympathetic care”19 if both the local authority and those that stand to be 
evicted grappled with the issues that pertain to the achievement of housing 
development objectives.20
The Court found that the constitutional obligations of local authorities 
dictate that they should initiate the engagement process and continue to make 
reasonable efforts to engage unlawful occupiers when their initial efforts are 
resisted or rebuffed.21 The Court foresaw that the unlawful occupiers will 
acquiesce in this process if it is managed by “careful and sensitive people”22 
with experience in housing matters. This process would enable a municipality 
to explore the vast range of possibilities that are available on the continuum 
spanning from eviction without more to the provision of permanent housing.23 
The Court found that the nature and extent of the engagement process would 
be determined by the underlying purpose of the eviction and the number of 
people that stand to be affected by the eviction.24 yacoob J noted that the 
City of Johannesburg should have been conscious of the fact that their Inner 
City Regeneration Strategy would have drastic consequences for its rapidly 
increasing poor population and that it would require “structured, consistent 
and careful engagement” with all the affected parties.25
The Court further underscored that the engagement process must be 
conducted in good faith and any attempt by the unlawful occupiers to derail 
the engagement process through unreasonable demands or by adopting an 
intractable attitude should not be tolerated.26 The Court emphasised this 
point by clearly stating that
“[p]eople in need of housing are not, and must not be regarded as a disempowered mass”.27
In conclusion, the Court noted that the constitutional value of openness 
should guide the engagement process so as to avoid the destructive allure 
of secrecy by ensuring that “a complete and accurate account of the process 
18 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 14  L Chenwi & K Tissington Engaging Meaningfully with Government on 
Socio-Economic Rights – A Focus on the Right to Housing (2010) 9 observe that the objectives will depend 
on the specific situation  They add that the government should not be the only party to determine what 
these objectives should be or how such objectives could be achieved
19 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 15
20 See also Centre for Applied Legal Studies Workshop Report: Meaningful Engagement (2009) 30-32 
<http://web wits ac za/NR/rdonlyres/D1176AF9-340B-413B-AF79-2F1152BE0CDA/0/Meaningful 
engagementreport_Dec09 pdf> (accessed 07-03-2010)
21 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 






27 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 20  See also T Ross “The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our 
Helplessness” (1991) 79 Geo LJ 1499 1499-1547  
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of engagement, including at least the reasonable efforts of the municipality 
within that process” is considered the norm.28
In this article I wish to engage with yacoob J’s contention that the need 
for meaningful engagement could be inferred from the applicant’s contention 
that the decision to evict constituted administrative action which required the 
occupiers to be heard before the decision was taken.29 I am intrigued by 
this point because later in the judgment yacoob J seems to contradict himself 
when he states that the obligation to engage meaningfully with occupiers who 
would be rendered homeless after an eviction was “squarely grounded” in 
section 26(2) of the Constitution. To my mind the question is whether, and 
to what extent, there is an intersection or duplication between the concept 
of meaningful engagement, in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution; 
and procedurally fair administrative action, in terms of section 33(1) of the 
Constitution.30 The aim of this article is to show that firstly, procedural 
fairness is not the same as meaningful engagement from a conceptual and 
doctrinal point of view; and secondly, meaningful engagement should be 
construed as a deliberative democratic partnership between local authorities 
and unlawful occupiers.
2  Procedural fairness
2 1  Administrative action affecting the public
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”), like 
meaningful engagement, provides adequately for public participation with 
both individuals or a specific household of unlawful occupiers, in terms of 
28 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 21
29 Para 9  In Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes (Centre on Housing 
Rights and Evictions, Amici Curiae) 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) O’Regan J added that “the obligation to engage 
meaningfully imposed by s 26(2) of the Constitution should be understood together with the obligation to 
act fairly imposed by s 33 of the Constitution, as spelt out in PAJA” (para 297)
30 In Minister of the Interior v Bechler 1948 3 SA 409 (A) 451 the former Appellate Division of the High 
Court defined the theory of natural justice as “the stereotyped expression which is used to describe 
those fundamental principles of [procedural] fairness which underlie every civilised system of law”  
These principles have been reduced over time to the maxims nemo iudex in sua causa and audi alteram 
partem which constitute the core of fair administrative action  The audi principle affords people the 
opportunity to participate in decisions that will affect them by apprising the administrative functionary 
of additional facts and possible alternatives that might influence the outcome of those decisions  This 
ensures the legitimacy of the decision because the quality and rationality of the decision is enhanced 
through respect for the dignity and worth of the people that stand to be affected  The application of the 
audi principle to administrative action was limited during the era of parliamentary sovereignty by the 
illogically rigid classification of administrative functions and the focus on decisions that prejudicially 
affected the property or liberty of an individual  However, towards the end of apartheid the Appellate 
Division changed this position dramatically by introducing the doctrine of legitimate expectation in 
South African law  See Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 4 SA 731 (A)  Since then the courts have 
retreated from the narrow and formalistic approach to natural justice to embrace a broader and more 
flexible duty to act fairly in all cases  This change of direction gained constitutional legitimacy with 
the inclusion of a right to just administrative action in s 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 200 of 1993 and s 33(1) of the Constitution  S 33(1) of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone 
has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair ” The Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 was enacted to give effect to s 33(1) of the Constitution
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section 3,31 and with a community of unlawful occupiers, in terms of section 
4,32 who stand to have their right of access to adequate housing adversely 
affected by the administrative decision to evict. Section 4 of PAJA concerns 
administrative action that “materially and adversely affects the rights of the 
public”.33 This is an innovative provision that incorporates new procedures 
for public participation into the general administrative law that has nearly 
no equivalent in the common law.34 However, this provision is “somewhat 
enigmatic”35 because it is uncertain what the precise relationship is with 
administrative action “which materially and adversely affects the rights or 
legitimate expectations of any person” in terms of section 3 of PAJA.
Mass36 argues that sections 3 and 4 are linked because there is no 
longer a need to limit the application of the audi principle if the aim is to 
“create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in public 
administration”.37 Mass accordingly insists that there is a very close link 
between section 4 and the more general requirements for procedural fairness 
in section 3(2)(b). She finds support for this argument in the fact that that 
section 4 does not contain all the requirements stipulated in section 3(2)(b). 
31 S 3(2) of PAJA reads:
“(a)   A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case
    (b)  In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator, 
subject to subsection (4), must give a person referred to in subsection (1) –
 (i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action;
 (ii)  a reasonable opportunity to make representations;
 (iii)   a clear statement of the administrative action;
 (iv)   adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and
 (v)  adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5 ”
32 S 4(1) of PAJA reads:
“In cases where an administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of the public, an 
administrator, in order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, must decide 
whether –
(a)  to hold a public inquiry in terms of subsection (2);
(b)  to follow a notice and comment procedure in terms of subsection (3);
(c)  to follow the procedures in both subsections (2) and (3);
(d)   where the administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow a procedure 
which is fair but different, to follow that procedure; or
(e)  to follow another appropriate procedure which gives effect to section 3 ”
33 S 1 of PAJA defines “public” as “any group or class of the public”
34 Decisions that affected large numbers of people were usually classified as “legislative” administrative 
action during the pre-democratic era and therefore the audi principle did not apply to them  In South 
African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 1991 4 SA 1 (A) Milne JA rejected the classification 
of administrative functions as either “quasi-judicial”, “purely administrative” or “legislative”  Milne JA 
proposed:
“[T]hat a distinction should be drawn between (a) statutory powers which, when exercised, affect 
equally members of the community at large and (b) those which, while possibly also having a general 
impact, are calculated to cause particular prejudice to an individual or particular group of individuals  
Here I use the word ‘individual’ to include a legal persona such as a corporation or a local authority, 
clothed with corporate personality; and the word ‘calculated’ to mean not ‘intended’ but ‘likely in the 
ordinary course of things’ to have this result ” (12E-G) (original emphasis)
 The effect was that cases which fell into the first category (the equivalent of s 4 of the PAJA) would not 
attract procedural fairness while cases which fell into the second category (the equivalent of s 3 of the 
PAJA) would attract procedural fairness unless a statutory provision specifically provided otherwise
35 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 364
36 C Mass “Section 4 of the AJA and Procedural Fairness in Administrative Action Affecting the Public: A 
Comparative Perspective” in C Lange & J Wessels (eds) The Right to Know – South Africa’s Promotion of 
Administrative Justice and Access to Information Acts (2004) 63  
37 Preamble of PAJA
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She therefore submits that section 4 cannot be freestanding because it is 
an incomplete provision that must be interpreted with recourse to the more 
general provisions for procedural fairness contained in section 3. The effect 
is that the relationship between sections 3 and 4 is “one of lex generalis and 
(incomplete) lex specialis”.38 Mass argues further that this approach to the 
relationship between sections 3 and 4 promotes the spirit, purport and objective 
of the right to just administrative action much better than one founded on the 
semantic distinctions drawn between administrative action affecting “any 
person” and administrative action affecting “the public”.39
Currie and Klaaren point to the drafting history of section 4 in support 
of their argument that this provision is completely freestanding.40 Currie 
and Klaaren argue that the Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio 
Committee severed the link between clauses 4 and 5 of the South African 
Law Reform Commission’s Draft Bill41 (currently sections 3 and 4 of PAJA) 
by changing the heading of clause 4 from “procedurally fair administrative 
action” to “procedurally fair administrative action affecting any person”. 
This, according to Currie and Klaaren, “created two separate and unrelated 
procedural fairness regimes”.42 Administrative action with a particular 
effect would then fall under the purview of section 3, while administrative 
action with a general effect would fall under the purview of section 4.43
This approach to the relationship between section 3 and 4 is problematic 
because there is no statutory right to procedural fairness for administrative 
action affecting the public parallel to that of section 3(1). Currie and Klaaren 
argue that the most helpful interpretation is to read “the right to procedurally 
fair administrative action” in section 3(1) as indirectly creating a general 
right to procedural fairness. This general right to procedural fairness would 
then also shape the minimum requirements administrators must adhere to in 
instances of administrative action affecting the public, since the requirements 
of section 3(2)(b) would simply not apply.44
Hoexter also points to the drafting history of section 4 in support of her 
argument that this provision is not linked to section 3. Hoexter notes that 
the Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio Committee mistakenly 
left a reference to section 3 in section 4(1)(e) during its amendment process. 
Hoexter attributes this to poor drafting and recommends that the reference 
should simply be expunged through the amendment of section 4.45 Hoexter 
also notes that there are minimum requirements for procedurally fair 
administrative action in section 4 similar to those contained in section 3(2)
38 Mass “Section 4 of the AJA” in The Right to Know 66-67
39 67
40 I Currie & J Klaaren The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) 110-113
41 South African Law Reform Commission Administrative Justice Project 115 Report (1999) <www justice
gov za/salrc/reports/r_prj115_aja_1999aug pdf> (accessed 30-01- 2010)
42 Currie & Klaaren Benchbook 113
43 This is in accordance with the distinction that Milne JA made in South African Roads Board v 
Johannesburg City Council 1991 4 SA 1 (A) 12E-G
44 Currie & Klaaren Benchbook 113
45 Hoexter Administrative Law 369
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(b).46 Finally, Hoexter argues that the attempted uncoupling of the two 
provisions and the narrower focus of section 3 is indicative of the “gulf” that 
exists between sections 3 and 4.47
The fact remains that section 4(1)(e) contains a reference to section 3 that 
cannot be ignored. Mass provides a workable approach that links sections 3 
and 4 through this “hangover” of the South African Law Reform Commission’s 
Draft Bill.48 According to this approach an administrator will not be required 
to superficially classify an administrative action affecting “any person” in 
terms of section 3 or administrative action affecting “the public” in terms 
of section 4 when it is clear that the administrative action affects both “any 
person” and “the public”.49 Currie and Klaaren conceded this point when the 
administrative action presents itself in along the factual lines of South African 
Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council.50 In this case the South African 
Roads Board declared an existing road a toll road. Currie and Klaaren explain 
that this decision would have a particular impact (section 3 of PAJA) on the 
Johannesburg City Council because it would have to upgrade its current roads 
infrastructure and increase maintenance to support the additional traffic 
congestion caused by motorists choosing alternative routes. The decision 
would also have a general effect (section 4 of PAJA) on all the motorists’ 
freedom of movement.
The result will be exactly the same where a local authority evicted a 
community of unlawful occupiers. The decision will have a particular impact 
on the surrounding local authorities because they would have to expand their 
housing programmes while also having a general impact on the community’s 
right of access to adequate housing. Hoexter confirms that “decisions with a 
general impact often have a special impact on particular people”.51
Furthermore, Mass does not focus disproportionately on the supposed 
intention of the legislature or its poor drafting abilities. Instead, her approach 
constitutes a purposive interpretation of the right to just administrative action 
that gives effect to the constitutional value of openness by making simpler and 
more efficient ways of public participation possible to the poor population of 
South Africa. While it is clear that PAJA provides simple and efficient forms 
of public participation it remains unclear whether these forms of participation 
follow the contours of meaningful engagement.
2 2  Participation procedures in section 4 of PAJA
It is clear from the structure of section 4 that a notice and comment 
procedure or a public inquiry or both are the default options available to an 
administrator.52 However, section 4 does not provide specific instructions for 
an administrator to guide her in deciding which procedure to follow. Currie 
46 375
47 375
48 Currie & Klaaren Benchbook 130
49 116
50 1991 4 SA 1 (A)
51 Hoexter Administrative Law 368
52 Mass “Section 4 of the AJA” in The Right to Know 73
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and Klaaren recommend that the following criteria should be used to decide 
the appropriate procedure:53 the geographic impact; and the subject matter 
of the proposed administrative action. A notice and comment procedure is 
based on the consideration of written submissions, which makes it more suited 
to administrative action on general issues with national or regional impact. 
A public inquiry is driven by hearing testimony at a particular place on a 
given time, which makes it more suited to administrative action on specific 
issues with a local impact. Mass adds that the following criteria could also be 
helpful:54 the cost and efficiency of the procedure; and the size and duration 
of the process. A notice and comment procedure is often simple and cheap 
because the administrator may not delegate her powers and consequently the 
procedure does not require many logistical arrangements. Public inquiries 
have the potential to be very complex and expensive because the administrator 
may delegate her powers to “a suitably qualified person or panel of persons”55 
who will conduct the public hearing.
A proposed decision to evict a community of unlawful occupiers will have 
a very specific impact on that particular community and could possibly extend 
to the surrounding local authorities as the unlawful occupiers move into 
other jurisdictions to find a place to stay. According to the abovementioned 
guidelines, circumstances of this nature will require conducting a public 
inquiry.
Regulation 5 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000: 
Regulations on Fair Administrative Procedures56 adds a new dimension to 
a public inquiry that may be invaluable to unlawful occupiers that stand to 
be evicted. The aim of Regulation 5 is to provide assistance to communities 
“consisting of a considerable proportion of people who cannot read or write or 
who otherwise need special assistance”.57 Hoexter explains that
“[t]his regulation sets out special steps to be taken to solicit the views of such people where they are 
likely to be affected by administrative action that may be taken as a consequence of a public inquiry. 
These steps may include the holding of public or group meetings where the issues are explained and 
views recorded, a survey of public opinion and the provision of secretarial assistance.”58
This goes beyond the common law understanding of the audi principle and 
embraces the constitutional value of openness in a way that ensures broader 
public participation.59
The public hearing will still be the core institutional feature of the public 
inquiry. While a public hearing is an effective way of obtaining the views and 
proposals of a community, it may be too adversarial60 in the housing context 
to ascertain anything of significance regarding the rights and needs of the 
community given that the impact of an eviction on the lives of the poor may 
53 Currie & Klaaren Benchbook 120
54 Mass “Section 4 of the AJA” in The Right to Know 73-74
55 S 4(2)(a) of PAJA
56 Published in GN R 1022 in GG 23674 of 31-07-2002
57 5
58 Hoexter Administrative Law 372
59 Mass “Section 4 of the AJA” in The Right to Know 74
60 78
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preclude any meaningful interchanges. It is similarly problematic to expect 
impoverished communities to make effective use of a notice and comment 
procedure.
In these instances an administrator may follow “another appropriate 
procedure which gives effect to section 3”.61 Mass suggests that this provision 
allows an administrator to interact with “the public” on an individual bases by 
affording them a distinct opportunity to make representations or to follow other 
innovative procedures like “consultations, mediation, and negotiated rule-
making”.62 These procedures require participation on a much smaller scale 
and their inquisitorial nature makes them cheaper and more efficient.63
This section shows that the public inquiry procedure provided for in terms 
of section 4 of PAJA could satisfy the need for two way interaction between 
the local government and the unlawful occupiers, good faith interaction 
between the parties, and a transparent account of the interaction process. 
However, what section 4 fails to ensure is that the public inquiry will achieve 
certain objectives, lead to the resolution of disputes by increasing mutual 
understanding and respect, or ensure that the process is initiated and driven 
by skilled local government officials.
2 3  Procedural fairness does not equal meaningful engagement
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Residents of Joe Slovo Community, 
Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes64 (“Residents of Joe Slovo”) the amici 
curiae65 argued that procedural fairness relates to the notion of participatory 
democracy because it ensured that individuals had an active role state 
administration.66 In Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the 
National Assembly67 the Constitutional Court explained that participation 
represents a powerful response to the legacy of apartheid by ensuring that 
excluded voices are empowered in wider participatory processes.68 This 
61 S 4(1)(e) of PAJA
62 Mass “Section 4 of the AJA” in The Right to Know 78
63 C Hoexter, R Lyster & A Currie The New Constitutional and Administrative Law II: Administrative Law 
(2002) 49
64 2010 3 SA 454 (CC)
65 In both cases the amici curiae were the Community Law Centre from the University of the Western Cape 
and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) from Geneva, Switzerland  Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg (Submissions 
of the Amici Curiae: Community Law Centre (UWC) and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE)) (CCT 24/07) ZACC (17-08-2007) Constitutional Court of South Africa <www constitutional 
court org za/Archimages/10661 PDF> (accessed 07-03-2010) (“Occupiers of Olivia Road amici 
submissions”)  Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes (Submissions of the 
Amici Curiae: Community Law Centre (UWC) and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE)) 
(CCT 22/08) ZACC (30-07-2008) Constitutional Court of South Africa <www constitutionalcourt org za/
Archimages/12720 PDF> (accessed 07-03-2010) (“Residents of Joe Slovo amici submissions”)
66 Occupiers of Olivia Road amici submissions para 136; Residents of Joe Slovo amici submissions para 
167
67 2006 6 SA 416 (CC)
68 I understand deliberative democracy to be a form of participatory democracy  The central tenet of 
participatory democracy is that participation in public debate and dialogue has transformative potential 
provided the participants in the process remain open-minded, are held accountable for their views, 
and do not evade the reality of deep structural inequalities  See S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 28-34
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conception of participatory democracy creates a unique link between the 
obligation of government to respect, protect and promote the fundamental 
rights in the Constitution and the right of excluded voices to access adequate 
housing. Section 4 of PAJA enables local government to fulfil this duty 
because “the public are likely to participate most robustly when their rights 
are materially and adversely affected”.69 Nedelsky explains that procedural 
fairness “offers the potential for providing subjects of bureaucratic power 
with some effective control as well as a sense of dignity, competence, and 
power”.70
This must be understood against the background that administrative 
decisions are often taken in stages71 and that procedural fairness must only 
be observed during the stage where a final decision is made.72 Hoexter notes 
that it would be impossible to have an efficient administration if it had to 
“provide full-scale hearings at every stage”.73 This is supported by the fact 
that “administrative action”74 must have a “direct” effect. The likelihood 
that preliminary decisions do not require the observance of procedural 
fairness is amplified by “pre-democratic reasoning”75 which dictates the 
interpretation of the requirement that a right must be “adversely” affected by 
the administrative action.76
This conceptualisation of the audi principle is especially problematic in 
the housing context given that any investigation into the living conditions 
of unlawful occupiers or the upgrading of their informal settlement could 
result in the lodging of an eviction application and relocation to another site 
that is far away from inter alia employment opportunities. Put differently, 
any investigation without procedural fairness not only has the potential to 
aggravate the already insecure existence of the unlawful occupiers, but could 
also erode the fundamental values of accountability, responsiveness and 
openness77 upon which our democracy is founded.78 This is demonstrated 
unmistakably by the events leading up to the Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, 
69 K Govender “An Assessment of Section 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 as a Means 
of Advancing Participatory Democracy in South Africa” (2003) 18 SAPL 404 409
70 J Nedelsky “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” (1989) 1 YJLF 7 27
71 Hoexter Administrative Law 392
72 See Chairman, Board on Tariffs and Trade v Brenco Inc 2001 4 SA 511 (SCA) paras 71-72
73 Hoexter Administrative Law 393
74 S 1 of PAJA defines “administrative action” as
“any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by – (a) an organ of state, when – (i) exercising 
a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power 
of performing a public function in terms of any legislation; or (b) a natural or juristic person, other 
than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of 
an empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, 
external legal effect …”
75 Hoexter Administrative Law 396
76 In R v Ngwevula 1954 1 SA 123 (A) 127F Centlivres CJ explained that preliminary inquiries, according 
to pre-democratic reasoning, did not “prejudicially affect … the property or liberty of an individual” 
because it was “purely administrative” in nature and, as such, did not require the observance of procedural 
fairness unless it was explicitly required by legislation  See Hoexter Administrative Law 351-353; Law 
Society, Northern Provinces v Maseka 2005 6 SA 372 (B) 382D-E
77 S 1(d) of the Constitution
78 See E Mureinik “Reconsidering Review: Participation and Accountability” (1993) Acta Juridica 35; G 
Quinot “Snapshot or Participatory Democracy? Political Engagement as Fundamental Human Right” 
(2009) 25 SAJHR 392  
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Residents of Joe Slovo and Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement SA v Premier 
of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal79 (“Abahlali baseMjondol”) cases, where 
the applicants alleged that the conduct of municipal officials towards them 
had been characterised by tactics aimed at persuading them to accept the 
plans that the government had for their future, threats of violence when 
they did not succumb to these tactics, attacks on their person when they 
denounced the government plans which were made without addressing their 
concerns or incorporating their proposals, and announcements that decisions 
had been taken about their future. These examples of abuse of power and 
blatant disregard for the inputs of the unlawful occupiers at the beginning of 
multi-stage decision making processes may fail to pass constitutional muster 
in the sense that they fall short of the lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair administrative action that the drafters of the Constitution had in mind 
or could even be excluded because it is executive action. The fact remains 
that these actions are common and reflect the lived reality of what the right to 
just administrative action amounts to for many poor people. Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road, Residents of Joe Slovo and Abahali baseMjondolo demonstrate 
that disastrous results can flow from preliminary inquiries into the housing 
conditions of unlawful occupiers where procedural fairness is not observed.
It is furthermore important to note that procedural fairness only applies to 
“administrative action”. The definition of “administrative action” explicitly 
excludes “the executive powers or function of the Provincial Executive” – which 
includes the powers referred to in sections 126 and 139 of the Constitution80 
– and the executive powers or functions of a municipal council.81 These 
exclusions are significant in the housing context because section 126 of the 
Constitution enables a MEC responsible for housing in a specific province 
to assign any power or function in terms of section 7 of the Housing Act to 
a municipality. Section 139 of the Constitution, on the other hand, obliges 
a MEC responsible for housing in a specific province to intervene where a 
municipality is unable or unwilling to fulfil its obligations in terms of section 9 
of the Housing Act. Section 156 of the Constitution provides that municipalities 
have executive authority in respect of, and the right to administer all matters 
listed in, Schedule 4B and 5B of the Constitution which, significantly, 
includes the provision of electricity and gas reticulation; water and sanitation; 
local amenities; refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal; and 
street lighting. The result is that many housing related decisions are excluded 
from the operation of PAJA because they are considered to be of an executive 
nature. Meaningful engagement would therefore play an important role in 
adjudicating this category of decisions that do not require the observation of 
procedural fairness in terms of PAJA. This is where meaningful engagement 
transcends procedural fairness.
79 2010 2 BCLR 99 (CC)
80 Subs (bb) of the definition of “administrative action” in s 1 of PAJA
81 Subs (cc) of the definition of “administrative action” in s 1 of PAJA
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3  Meaningful engagement as deliberative democratic 
partnership
Both the Housing Act and meaningful engagement flow from section 
26(2) of the Constitution. Section 2(1)(b) and (1)(l) of the Housing Act lay 
the foundation for the establishment of a dialogic relationship between the 
executive and other role players in housing development which could be a 
useful reference for the interpretation of meaningful engagement. The general 
principles contained in these provisions concretise into obligations that 
require municipalities to ensure that they promote the resolution of conflicts 
that arise in the housing development process,82 and facilitate and support 
the participation of other role players in the housing development process.83 
However, these general principles and obligations stop short of ensuring that 
the dialogue is managed by careful and sensitive people who will continue 
to make good faith efforts to engage so as to ensure that an increased 
understanding of the interests involved and sympathetic care for the unlawful 
occupiers are developed. Meaningful engagement therefore clearly foresees 
a change in the approach to and practice of participation – specifically its 
duration and nature – in housing development.
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road the Constitutional Court stated that 
meaningful engagement should ordinarily be initiated before litigation 
commences84 because the outcome of the engagement process will be 
important for any court in determining whether it would be just and equitable 
to grant an eviction order.85 In Residents of Joe Slovo the Court ordered the 
parties to engage on certain issues as part of the final order.86 Meaningful 
engagement therefore requires the fostering of participation over a long period 
of time that commences with the conceptualisation of a plan, policy or piece 
of legislation, and culminates with the implementation and preservation of 
such plan, policy or legislation.87
Participation during this process cannot be characterised by manipulation, 
threats of violence, and similar announcements which the applicants 
in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Residents of Joe Slovo and Abahlali 
baseMjondolo attested to because it would be at odds with the dialogic, 
transparent, “structured, consistent and careful”88 engagement that the 
Constitutional Court described. The nature of the participation during the 
engagement process should rather be determined with reference to the ladder 
of citizen participation that Arnstein developed in the housing context from 
82 S 9(1)(e) of the Housing Act
83 S 9(2)(a)(vi)  
84 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 30
85 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 18  See also Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha 
Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 338
86 See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 7 
order 5  
87 See Chenwi & Tissington Engaging Meaningfully with Government 21
88 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 19
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the terminology used in federal programmes of the United States of America 
that are directed at inter alia urban renewal.89
The ladder consists of eight rungs, with each rung representing a form 
of participation. The bottom two rungs – manipulation90 and therapy91 – 
describe levels where no participation takes place. These rungs are used as a 
substitute for genuine participation because the objectives of these forms of 
participation are to educate and cure citizens.92 The following three rungs – 
informing,93 consultation94 and placation95 – describe levels of tokenism 
where citizens are informed of government plans and may voice their concerns 
regarding these plans. Arnstein notes that these rungs do not ensure citizens 
that their concerns will be heeded and as such do not confer any real power to 
effect a change in the status quo.96 The final three rungs – partnership,97 
delegated powers98 and citizen control99 – describe levels of citizen power, 
where citizens are afforded increasing degrees of decision-making power “by 
which they can induce significant social reform” and which “[enable] them to 
share in the benefits of the affluent society”.100
89 SR Arnstein “A Ladder of Citizen Participation” (1969) 35 Journal of the American Iinstitute for Planners 
216  
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The terminology used in the Housing Act and the experiences of the 
unlawful occupiers in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Residents of Joe Slovo and 
Abahlali baseMjondolo indicates that participation in housing development 
currently occurs on the first five rungs of the participation ladder.101 
Conversely, the description of meaningful engagement indicates that it could 
not extend to the final two rungs of the participation ladder because that 
would have the effect of delegating or abdicating the constitutional duties of 
the executive to the unlawful occupiers. It is therefore clear that partnership, 
as a form of participation, most closely resembles the contours of meaningful 
engagement.
Arnstein explains that partnership, as a form of participation, would only 
work for as long as all the possible parties to the partnership find it useful 
to maintain the partnership.102 The possible parties to an engagement 
process – the community that stands to be affected by the eviction and the 
government – will find it useful to maintain this partnership if their concerns 
and limitations are appreciated as legitimate and real. However, this will 
only occur if the parties, their legal representatives and other possible parties 
re-evaluate their respective roles.
A community cannot be allowed to persist with unreasonable demands 
and must rather focus its energy and resources on electing a community 
leader or committee that is empowered with a clear mandate to organise and 
mobilise the community. The community leader or committee must ensure 
that communication with the community is done in clear language and in 
a culturally appropriate manner. The community leader or committee must 
be able to engage openly with other parties and ensure that all outcomes 
of any engagement are referred back to the community for approval before 
finalisation.103
The legal representatives of the community must be prevented from 
approaching the case with so much vigour that they prejudice the rights of their 
clients. Instead, the legal representatives must ensure that they obtain a clear 
mandate from the community so as to position themselves as the secondary 
voice to the community leaders during the engagement process. This will not 
only ensure the fostering of a trust relationship between the community leaders 
and the legal representatives, but will also allow the legal representatives to 
facilitate the mobilisation and organisation of the community.104
101 In Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC), Sachs J 
observed that
“[t]he evidence suggests the frequent employment of a top-down approach where the purpose of 
reporting back to the community was seen as being to pass on information about decisions already 
taken rather than to involve the residents as partners in the process of decision-making itself ” (Para 
378, footnote omitted)
102 Arnstein (1969) Journal of the American Institute for Planners 221  The ladder of citizen participation 
provides a systematic characterisation of the types of participation that I found useful when evaluating 
the opposing accounts of the nature and duration of the public participation that took place in Occupiers 
of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 
208 (CC), Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) and 
Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement of South Africa v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal 2010 2 BCLR 99 (CC)
103 Centre for Applied Legal Studies Workshop Report: Meaningful Engagement 37
104 38  
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Non-governmental organisations will also have to ply their advocacy105 
and research skills to support the engagement process. They can do so by 
facilitating the organisation and mobilisation of the community; ensuring that 
the legal representatives of the community are properly informed of existing 
international norms and examples from comparative jurisdictions that can be 
relied on to develop the law and, finally, providing a court with a range of 
statistical data and budgetary information that may not appear in the papers 
of the parties.106
The government cannot be allowed to persist with its intractable institutional 
and bureaucratic attitude which dictates that all people living in intolerable 
conditions must be viewed as criminals or “at least to some degree as morally 
degenerate”.107 The government must rather ensure that it trains careful and 
sensitive officials to engage with communities in a manner that is characterised 
by access to information, flexibility, reasonableness, and transparency so that 
it can fulfil its constitutional and statutory obligations to provide access to 
adequate housing.
Conceived in this way, meaningful engagement is a type of public 
participation that transcends procedural fairness in terms of section 33 of the 
Constitution and sections 3 and 4 of PAJA in two ways. First, the process of 
meaningful engagement occurs over a long period of time, as opposed to the 
moment of decision-making in multi-staged administrative decision-making. 
Second, the nature of the participation required by meaningful engagement 
for it to be meaningful mandates the forging of a partnership between the 
government and the occupiers. It is only through the fostering of this long 
term relationship that unlawful occupiers will be able to rise above the often 
misconceived perceptions of being helpless, passive and weak recipients of 
government largesse.108
4  Conclusion
Meaningful engagement creates a space for public participation that 
transcends procedural fairness in terms of PAJA. In this space the unlawful 
occupiers are required to appreciate the budgetary and policy challenges 
of providing for a range of interests, while the government must listen and 
respond with compassion to the plight of the urban poor.109 Meaningful 
engagement must be viewed as an innovative mechanism for enforcing socio-
economic rights.110 In the long term individual engagement processes will 
create an incentive to develop the “multi-faceted and robust housing policies 
that section 26 arguably requires”111 by incorporating the range of housing 
105 See B Ray “Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road: Enforcing the Right to Adequate Housing Through ‘Engagement’” 
(2008) 8 HRLR 703 711 for an explanation of why it is significant that the Constitutional Court envisaged 
an active role for civil society in the engagement process
106 Centre for Applied Legal Studies Workshop Report: Meaningful Engagement 39
107 42
108 See Nedelsky (1989) YJLF 27
109 See Chenwi & Tissington Engaging Meaningfully with Government 9
110 Ray (2008) HRLR 708
111 709
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needs of unlawful occupiers. Meaningful engagement requires government 
to take certain positive steps without mandating it to implement a specific 
court-directed housing development programme. The immediate remedial 
effect is that the unlawful occupiers may be able to retain their existing access 
to housing – with some improvements to render it safer and more suitable for 
human habitation – or to gain access to alternative accommodation that is of 
a relatively better standard.112
Furthermore, meaningful engagement ensures that a dialogic relationship 
is established between the local government and the unlawful occupiers.113 
This is preferable to a relationship which requires judicial intervention and 
control. The effect is that meaningful engagement will ensure that government 
appreciates the nature and scope of its constitutional and statutory obligations 
to provide access to adequate housing. Meaningful engagement will transform 
the way in which government approaches housing development projects in the 
sense that it will have to appraise itself of, inter alia: firstly, the full range 
of consequences that could flow from the proposed housing development; 
secondly, what will be required to alleviate the plight of those living in 
deplorable conditions and, finally, the cost and extent of interim measures it 
may need to take.
The only way in which this will happen is if both government and the 
unlawful occupiers approach the engagement process in good faith and with 
a renewed appreciation of their respective roles. This will ensure that the 
engagement process that creates the space for public participation and dialogue 
is open, honest and transparent. Proceeding from this foundation will make it 
easier for the parties to find common ground and thereby foster an increased 
understanding and appreciation by unlawful occupiers of the limitations of 
government while simultaneously enabling government to respond to the 
plight of the unlawful occupiers with sympathetic care and concern.
In Residents of Joe Slovo the Constitutional Court made it clear that 
meaningful engagement could even have a role to play at the remedial stage 
of litigation in relation to controlling the effects of an eviction order. While 
engagement at this stage should by no means be viewed as a substitute for 
the engagement that precedes litigation, engagement at this stage could focus 
on the upgrading of the properties where the unlawful occupiers currently 
reside in order to make it safer or more suitable for human habitation.114 
However, engagement at this stage115 will invariably pertain to the details 
112 See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg (Agreement 29 October 2007) (CCT 24/07) ZACC (29-10-2007) cls 5-13; Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 7 order 10
113 In Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC), Sachs J 
observed that “[w]hen all is said and done, and the process [meaningful engagement] has run its course, 
the authorities and the families will still be connected in ongoing constitutional relationships” (para 
408)
114 See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg (Interim Order 30 August 2007) (CCT 24/07) ZACC (30-08-2007) orders 1 and 2
115 The recent judgment of the Constitutional Court in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v 
Thubelisha Homes (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as Amici Curiae) 2011 7 BCLR 723 (CC) 
illustrates that meaningful engagement at this late stage may not bear any fruits
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of the eviction,116 possible relocation to temporary accommodation,117 and 
ultimately the provision of permanent alternative accommodation.118
SUMMARY
Nearly four years ago the Constitutional Court created the concept of “meaningful engagement” 
in Occupiers of Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). The Constitutional Court described meaningful engagement as a 
“two-way process” in which a local authority and those that stand to be evicted would talk to each other 
meaningfully in order to achieve certain objectives. This article questions whether, and to what extent, 
there is an intersection or duplication between meaningful engagement, in terms of section 26(2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and procedural fairness, in terms of section 33(1) of 
the Constitution and sections 3 and 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’). 
It is argued that meaningful engagement cannot be synonymous with procedural fairness because the 
definition of “administrative action” in section 1 of PAJA would limit the application of meaningful 
engagement by excluding executive action from its ambit. Furthermore, both the envisaged nature 
and duration of engagement ensures that meaningful engagement transcends procedural fairness. It is 
therefore argued that meaningful engagement should rather be construed as a deliberative democratic 
partnership between local government and unlawful occupiers. This partnership demands that all the 
parties, including legal representatives and NGO’s, involved in evictions should re-appreciate their 
respective roles. Finally, it is posited that meaningful engagement is a welcome addition to South 
African law because it has the potential of fostering increased understanding and appreciation by 
unlawful occupiers of the limitations of government while simultaneously enabling government to 
respond to the plight of the unlawful occupiers with sympathetic care and concern.
116 See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 7 
orders 4-7, 11-15
117 Orders 8-10
118 Orders 17-20  
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